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I. PLEADING
A. Joinder of Actions
In two important decisions rendered during the survey period the
Tennessee Supreme Court considered some of the aspects of joinder
of actions under present circuit court practice. In the first of these,
Necessary v. Gibson,' plaintiff joined a count for personal injuries resulting from defendants' alleged negligence with a count seeking recovery in contract based upon alleged promises of defendants to pay
plaintiff for her injuries and expenses arising out of the same accident.
The trial court sustained a demurrer upon the ground that the counts
were repugnant and inconsistent. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that under existing statutes2 such joinder is permitted,
and that the contrary rule existing at common law is no longer in
effect. The court indicated that separate trials can be ordered if "distinct" or "diverse" issues are presented. The court construed one of the
statutes 3 as permitting such joinder only when the two counts or claims
arise out of the same incident or transaction so as to be "intimately
related," but said that the other statute 4 would authorize joinder of
entirely separate claims growing out of unrelated transactions. Such
joinder, however, would in all cases be subject to the existing rule forbidding repugnancy-"the affirmation of a cause of action in one count
and the denial of that cause of action in another count." 5 The allegations in the present case were held not to violate this rule.
This case should be considered with the case of Oman Construction
Co. v. Tennessee Central Ry., 6 decided on the same date. There the
plaintiff sued three defendants. In the first count of the declaration,
plaintiff alleged breach of contract by all of the defendants and sought
damages allegedly caused thereby. In the second and third counts all
three defendants were sued in tort for alleged joint and concurring
negligence. The supreme court held, however, that the allegations of
the first count were insufficient to state a cause of action in contract
as to one of the defendants. The demurrer of that defendant to that
count was accordingly sustained. The court then held that a further
demurrer by this defendant to the entire declaration was good and
should be sustained on ground of misjoinder-that is, that the tort
counts against all defendants were improperly joined with the contract
count which properly pertained only to the other two defendants. The
court stated that it is a prerequisite to joinder of different causes of
1. 370 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. 1963).

2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-801, -809 (1956).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-809 (1956).

4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-801 (1956).
5. 370 S.W.2d at 556.
6. 370 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1963).
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action in the same declaration "'that all of the causes should affect all
parties to the action, both parties defendant and parties plaintiff.' 27
The court ruled, however, that only the party misjoined could raise
the question, and overruled demurrers of the other two defendants as
to whom all three counts were held applicable.
This decision certainly may be considered as limiting the situations
in which joinder is permissible and would confine the rule of Necessary
v. Gibson to cases where all of the joined claims affect all of the parties
to the suit. It has raised questions as to the long accepted practice of
suing alleged joint tortfeasors in an ordinary tort action, but of inserting in the declaration various counts describing separately the negligent actions (especially statutory violations) of the several defendants. For example, it is quite common for plaintiff to sue A and B
jointly in a "common-law" count, then to add a statutory count against
A alone and a separate statutory count against B. Does this practice
violate the rule of the Oman case? Must each count "affect all parties
to the action" in this situation?
It should be remembered that both the Necessary case and the
Oman case involved the joinder of contract claims with tort claims.
Neither was actually concerned with the joint tortfeasor problem. The
accepted practice of stating different theories of liability against different defendants resulting from the same transaction was not expressly
disapproved by the Oman decision, although admittedly the broad
language of the opinion could be construed to apply to such cases.
B. Amendment of Pleadings and Intervention of Parties
In Fidelity Bankers Trust Co. v. Chapman Drug Co.,8 after defend-

ant in a chancery suit had filed a sworn answer to the original bill and
after proof had been taken and the cause argued, defendant sought to
file an amendment to its answer setting out a new and different defense to the action. The chancellor disallowed the proposed amendment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court pointed
out that the allowing of amendments is largely within the discretion of
the trial judge, and his action is reversible only when there is a clear
abuse of discretion. Amendments as to form are, of course, readily
permitted. An amendment to a sworn pleading, setting 'up claims contrary to the original pleading and to the sworn testimony is much less
likely to be granted, however, and no abuse of discretion in this respect
was found in the present case.9
7. 370 S.W.2d at 574, quoting from 1 AM. Jun. 2d, Actions § 123 (1962).
8. 366 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
9. For a holding that a circuit judge was within his discretion in disallowing an
amendment to a declaration after a demurrer had been sustained, see Daniels v. Talent,
370 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1963).
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In the same case, after the cause had been argued, a motion was
made to permit the intervention of certain individuals to assert a claim
against the estate of which complainant was the executor. The suit
had been filed by complainant as such executor on behalf of this estate,
which was being administered in the probate court and which was
solvent. The chancellor denied the petition to intervene on the ground
that new and extraneous issues would be injected, not germane to the
original issues and that the intervening claim was matter for a separate original bill or claim in the probate court. The court of appeals
found no abuse of discretion in this ruling and affirmed.
C. Demurrer
1. Construction of Pleading.-In Jackson v. Kemp, 10 the plaintiff
sued for personal injuries and expenses resulting from an automobile
accident. The accident had occurred more than one year prior to the
filing of the suit, and by demurrer the defendant interposed the oneyear statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions in tort."
The trial court sustained this ground of the demurrer. The supreme
court, however, held that the gravamen of the claim was for breach of
contract rather than for tort, so that a six-year statute of limitations
governed.' 2 Plaintiff alleged that he had been promised by defendant,
an insurance claims manager, that if he would not employ an attorney
to file suit on the claim, the insurance carrier would compensate him
for his injuries and expenses in the automobile accident. Plaintiff
alleged his forbearance to sue in reliance on this promise for more than
one year and claimed a subsequent breach by defendant. The court
pointed out that such forbearance constitutes valid consideration for
a promise to pay.' 3 It further held that defendant's promise had induced plaintiff's forbearance, so that defendant would be estopped to
plead the one-year statute.' 4
A second ground of the demurrer which had also been sustained by
the trial court was that the subject matter of the alleged contract was
so vague and indefinite that the contract could not be enforced. Again
the supreme court disagreed, holding that plaintiff could establish his
damages in the contract action in the same manner as he could do in a
tort action for personal injuries. The fact that his damages were unliquidated was held to be no bar to the suit, and the court stated that
defendant could raise the same defenses in resisting the action as
could be raised if the suit were in tort, insofar as liability or damages
10. 365 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1963), 31 TENN. L. REv. 249 (1964).
11. TENN. CODE
T.§ 28-304 (1956).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-309 (1956).
13. Williams v. McElhaney, 203 Tenn. 602, 315 S.W.2d 106 (1957); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS §§ 75,76 (1932).
14. Approving the principle stated in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
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were concerned. In effect the result seems to be that plaintiff was permitted to proceed as though his case were one in tort for personal injuries, with defendant merely being estopped to raise the one-year
statute of limitations but being otherwise free to assert any defenses
to the merits which he might have.
D. Set-off and Counterclaims
The liberal Tennessee statute permitting the assertion of "every
claim or demand against the suing parties" by plea of setoff or by counter-declaration in actions between a resident and a non-resident 15 was
applied in a case decided by the court of appeals.' 6 Plaintiff, a resident
of Ohio, sued a local bank for the proceeds of a savings account. By
way of setoff defendant averred that the deposit in question was the
proceeds of government bonds wrongfully redeemed by the plaintiff
through the bank and that the bank had been compelled to reimburse
the federal government for the amount of the bonds. The circuit court
sustained the plea and the court of appeals affirmed. Under the terms
of the statute referred to, any kind of claim may be set up by way of
defense or counterclaim, whether arising out of the same or a different
transaction, and whether liquidated or not. There is no requirement of
"mutuality" between the original claim and the setoff when the requi17
site diversity of residence exists.
II. JUBISDICMION AND VENUE
A. Local Actions
A localizing provision of the general venue statutes was held to
affect the actual jurisdiction or power of a circuit court to entertain
an action brought in violation of the statute. 18 The statute provides
that when the parties to an action are residents of the same county,
the action shall be brought in the county of their residence. 19 In the
present case a tort action was instituted in a circuit court in a different
county from that in which both parties resided. Defendant filed a
general issue plea to the merits of the action. Thereafter he was permitted, over plaintiff's objection, to withdraw his plea and file a plea
in abatement challenging the "jurisdiction" of the court because of the
residence of both parties in another county. The circuit court sustained the plea in abatement. In affirming, the supreme court stated
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1008 (1956).
16. Marlowe v. First State Bank, 371 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).

17. Even if non-residence of the opposite party is not known to the pleader, the
benefit of the statute is available if in fact there is a diversity of residence at the time
of the filing of the plea of setoff or the counterclaim. Sliger v. Parks, 196 Tenn. 676,
270 S.W.2d 319 (1954).

18. Curtis v. Garrison, 211 Tenn. 339, 364 S.W.2d 993 (1963).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-401 (1956).
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that the residence of both parties in the same county converts an otherwise transitory action into a local action. The issue ceases to be merely
one of venue. Improper venue, of course, may normally be waived in
transitory actions, and must be raised by plea in abatement before a
plea to the merits is entered. 20 But in local actions, the suit must be
brought in the county where the subject matter lies, and it cannot be
maintained in any other county, even by consent of the parties. 21 Accordingly, in the instant case the supreme court held that defendant
could not be said to have waived the question by his general appearance and plea. Jurisdiction of the "subject matter" was lacking in the
county of suit, and any judgment rendered by it would have been
beyond its power and void, according to the opinion.22
The localizing statute, of course, is a salutory one, designed to prevent unfair tactics in suing a defendant away from his home and
among strangers."23 Nevertheless, it is a venue statute, and the holding that it is sufficiently forceful to curb the power of a trial court of
general jurisdiction seems to give undue importance to a seemingly
procedural provision. It would seem that if the defendant did not
raise the question of improper venue by an appropriate preliminary
plea, the court should not be without power to enter a valid judgment
binding upon the parties.
B. Equitable Actions in Circuit Court
In the somewhat unusual case of Hewqley v. Trice,24 a claim was
filed against an estate in the probate court. The executrix of the estate
denied the claim and demanded a jury trial. Consequently the case
was transferred to circuit court for trial as provided by statute.2 Because the claim presented numerous items involving a complicated
accounting, the circuit judge treated it as an equitable action, withdrew the issues from the jury, and decided them himself. On appeal,
this action was affirmed. The court of appeals found that there was no
material evidence introduced to create an issue for jury decision in any
event, even if the action were regarded as legal in nature. In the
alternative, however, it pointed out that the circuit court has statutory
authorization to hear equitable causes unless the defendant objects by
20. TEmr. CoDE Ar. § 20-406 (1956).

21. Keeble v. Loudon Util., 370 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1963); Shelby County v. Memphis, 211 Tenn. 410, 365 S.W.2d 291 (1963); Mayor of Nashville v. Webb, 114 Tenn.
432,85 S.W. 404 (1904).
22. To the same effect, that a plea in abatement may be sustained after a general
appearance when it challenges the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
see Caton v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 211 Tenn. 334, 364 S.W.2d 931 (1963).
23. Curtis v. Garrison, 211 Tenn. 339, 343, 364 S.W.2d 933, 935 (1963).
24. 369 S.W.2d 741 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
25. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 30-517 (1956).
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demurrer.2 6 In equity cases there is no right to a jury trial in cases
involving complicated accounting. 27 The court of appeals held that
the statute transferring to the circuit court probate claims where there
is a jury demand 28 does not compel the circuit judge to submit issues
to a jury if the action is equitable in nature. The form of action is not
fixed as one at law, and the circuit judge shall proceed with it as any
other case-treating it as legal or equitable according to its nature.
C. Probate Court-Restoration of Sanity
In a case of first impression the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
a probate (or county) court in this state can restore the competency of
a person adjudged insane in another state, where the applicant has resided in Tennessee for one year before filing his petition. z9 The court
recognized that an adjudged incompetent cannot normally change his
domicile or legal residence, because of his disability. Therefore he remains the ward of court in which he was adjudged. A Tennessee
statute provides that if an incompetent comes into Tennessee, his
return to the state where he was adjudged may be demanded. 30 There
is a one-year limitation upon this procedure, however, 3' and the court
found a legislative intent in this limitation that after passage of the
one-year period the incompetent might apply to Tennessee courts for
his restoration. The local courts were held to have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the issues presented under such a petition.
III. PRE-TnmL,

TmAL AND PosT-TmAL PRocmuuS

A. Discovery Depositions
In the case of Marlowe v. First State Bank of Jacksboro,32 the court
of appeals held that a non-resident plaintiff who selects local courts
as a forum must normally present himself for oral examination in this
state at his own expense when defendant requests his pre-trial deposition. He may, of course, apply to the court for relief if this imposes an
undue burden or hardship upon him, and the court may make such
order regarding the taking of the deposition as the situation requires. 33
In the instant case, no such application had been made, and the plaintiff was accordingly required to bear her own travel expenses.
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-511 (1956).
27. Greene County Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 75 S.W.2d 49 (E.S.
1934).
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-517 (1956).
29. In re Chaffee, 211 Tenn. 88, 362 S.W.2d 467 (1962).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-1004 (1956).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-1010 (1956).

32. 371 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1205 (Supp. 1963).
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B. Examination of Witnesses
In Cobb v. Waddell,3 4 defendant assigned as error the refusal of the
circuit judge to permit the questioning of a witness on redirect examination as to matters not previously touched upon in direct or crossexamination. The court of appeals held that the matter was within the
discretion of the trial judge and found no abuse of discretion and no
harmful error in any event in his ruling. The proposed inquiry had to
do with efforts of a police officer to deliver a traffic citation to plaintiff
following an automobile accident.
C. Separation of Issues in Jury Trial
One of the most significant cases reported during the survey period
was Winters v. Floyd.35 The suit was begun as a tort action for personal injuries. By special plea defendant set up a release executed by
plaintiffs. In their replications, plaintiffs attacked the validity of the
release. Upon motion of defendant, the trial judge severed and tried
separately the issues concerning the validity of the release. The court
of appeals held that this procedure was erroneous and sustained plaintiffs' assignments of error based thereon. Relying upon a recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court,36 the court held that the right
of jury trial, as guaranteed by the state constitution, includes the right
to have all issues of fact submitted to the same jury at the same time.
The court indicated that the trial court might constitutionally sever
separate "causes of action," but held that it could not separate and try
independently certain fact issues surrounding the same cause of action.
Having reached this decision upon the basis of a constitutional question, the court went further and in dictum disapproved the practice of
trying separate issues even if constitutionally permissible. The court
expressed doubt as to whether less prejudice to an insurance carrier
would really result from separate trials, and indicated that the trial
judge could hold to a minimum the references to insurance personnel
in obtaining a release-at least as to the "insurance capacity" in which
an adjuster acted on behalf of the defendant.
Probably a number of trial lawyers and judges would question some
portions of this opinion, insofar as the discussion of efficient judicial
administration or jury prejudice is concerned. It is true that jurors
generally know of the widespread carriage of liability insurance.
Nevertheless, most defense attorneys have felt that it would be prejudicial to the defendant to have to try before the same jury the validity
of a release obtained by a claims adjuster and also the issues of liability
and damages. It has generally been felt that if the release were held
34. 369 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).

35. 367 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
36. Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 534, 354 S.W.2d 464 (1962).

1116

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW[

[VOL. 17

invalid-particularly if found to have been fraudulently obtained or
the result of sharp practice-the jurors who so found would be more
likely to resolve against the defendant the other issues in the case than
would a separate jury. Inasmuch as the real basis for the decision in
the instant case seems to be the constitutional right of jury trial, however, the discussion of trial procedure is a secondary matter. If, in fact,
there is a violation of constitutional right in separating issues of this
sort, no further discussion of the procedure would seem necessary.
D. Reading of Pleadings and Argument of Counsel
By statute certain practices of counsel in presenting a case were
expressly authorized. 37 These include the use of a blackboard for the
purpose of summarizing damages, the argument of a monetary value
for pain and suffering in personal injury cases where support for such
argument exists in the record, and the reading of the amount sued for
in the declaration. Of these, probably the second is the only really
controversial practice, and there is still open the question of how to
determine when there is a sufficient evidentiary basis to support an
argument of this nature.
E. Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution
In White v. College Motors, Inc.,38 the trial judge dismissed two
damage suits for lack of prosecution. Ten terms of court had elapsed
between the service of process and the filing of a declaration. Defendants promptly filed a plea, and five more terms of court elapsed
before the cases were dismissed upon motion of defendants. Nearly
five years had passed between the filing of suit and the dismissal. The
supreme court held that under these circumstances the trial judge
might well have concluded that the actions had been abandoned. His
dismissal of the suits was held proper even though prior notice of the
motion to dismiss was not given plaintiffs by defense counsel.
Probably one of the areas of circuit court procedure most in need
of modernization is the practice under which suits may be begun
merely by having a summons issued. 39 Of course if the plaintiff does
not promptly plead, the defendant may move to dismiss, but such
dismissal does not go to the merits. 40 Consequently the defendant
gains little by making the motion. The result is that many suits are
begun by summons and lie dormant for months or years without action
of any sort. Perhaps a requirement of the filing of a complaint in order
to begin an action might deter the filing of many non-meritorious
37. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1326 to -1328 (Supp. 1963).

38. 370 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1963).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-201 (1956).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-106 (1956).

40.
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actions. A regular policing of the docket by the trial judges might
also help eliminate many suits which are filed in the hope of obtaining
nuisance-value settlements and with no real expectation of proceeding
to trial.
F. Motion for New Trial
It is generally assumed in Tennessee that a motion for new trialthe most important post-trial step taken in the trial court under
existing practice-must be in writing. Probably most local court rules
so require. In all events good practice dictates that the motion be
written and, of course, filed within the time allowed by statute 4' and
42
by local rules. In the case of Horn v. Commercial Carriers,Inc.,
however, the court of appeals held that if the trial court accepts and
acts upon an oral motion for new trial, the appellate courts will accept
this and will not dismiss an appeal in error or decline to review the
record below merely because there was no written motion for new
trial. The record in that case affirmatively showed that a motion had
been timely made and overruled by the trial judge; it did not show
that the motion was in writing or any rule of the trial court requiring
such motion to be in writing. Accordingly the appellate court overruled a motion to dismiss the appeal and reviewed the case on its
merits.
0. Consent Decree
The binding effect of a consent decree was considered by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Third National Bank v. Scribner.43 In
1954 the parties to the litigation had been parties to a suit which
had terminated in a consent decree, defining the duties of a trustee
under a testamentary trust and ratifying certain leases. In this
case an attempt was made to set aside the earlier decree, although
there was no allegation of fraud or mutual mistake. Both the trial
court and the appellate court held that the prior decree was binding
and determinative. A consent decree is in the nature of a contract
of record, made by the parties and approved by the court. It is binding and conclusive upon the parties and is similar to a judgment
in its force and effect. One basis of the attack in the present case
was that the trust was "spendthrift," so that the beneficiary could
not consent to a violation of its terms. Although both the chancellor
and the supreme court found that there was capacity to make the
contract in question, an earlier decision by the supreme court makes
clear that the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust can bind himself by
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-201 (1956).
42. 365 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
43. 370 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1963).
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consent decree to a construction of the trust instrument from which
44
he cannot later depart.
H. Revival and Survival of Actions
The distinction between the revival of an action brought by the
decedent before his death and a wrongful death action was discussed in Gipson v. Memphis St. Ry. 45 There the injured person sued
for her injuries, but subsequently died from an independent cause.
Her suit was revived in the name of the next of kin, who amended
and alleged that death had been due to the injuries out of which the
suit arose. Both the trial and appellate court held as a matter of law
that there was no causal connection between the injuries and the
death. Since there was no actionable wrongful death, the only remaining claim was the original one for the injuries sued upon in the
original action. The controlling statutes, however, require that such
an action must be revived in the name of the personal representative
of the deceased, 46 and this had not been done. Had a causal connection between these injuries and the subsequent death been established,
the case would have fallen within the provisions of the wrongful
death statutes and could have been prosecuted by either the next of
kin or the personal representative for their benefit. 47 This is a rather
nice distinction and one that might easily be overlooked. Accordingly
it would seem wise, in cases involving close issues as to causal
connection between injury and death, to revive the original action
in the name of the personal representative. Regardless of whether
the evidence does or does not establish a connection between the
injury and the death, the personal representative can proceed with
the suit.
I. Distribution of Condemnation Proceeds
A case of first impression and one that may be of widespread
interest in the handling of condemnation proceeds where there are
owners of different estates in the land taken is State ex rel Moulten v.
Burkhart.48 There the state, as condemnor, paid into court a sum of
money alleged to be the amount due the owners. The property taken
was under commercial lease, but the petition did not specify the
value of the separate interests of the lessor and lessee. The authorizing
statute provides that the petition need not specify the interests of the
various defendants in the condemnation proceeding. 4 The lessee,
44. Burton v. Burton, 208 Tenn. 11, 343 S.W.2d 867 (1961).
45. 364 S.W.2d 110 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-602, 20-618 (1956).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1956).

48. 370 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1963).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1530 (Supp. 1963).
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however, filed a motion to dismiss unless there was a specification of
the interests, averring that appraisers for the state had separately
valued the leasehold. In the alternative, the lessee sought to withdraw
from the court the amount allegedly allotted to it in the appraisal, in
full settlement of its claim.50 The trial court entered an order denying
the lessee's motion, rbciting that the condemnor did not oppose the
motion but that the lessor opposed it. On appeal, the supreme court
reversed. It observed that the condemning authority is not obligated
to fix separate valuations upon the different real property interests.
Where, however, it admittedly has done so and does not oppose the
withdrawal of the amount set for one of the interests, then the owner
of that interest should be permitted to withdraw the amount allotted
to him; he should not have to await a trial of the valuations of the
other interests involved. The owners of the other interests could
not be prejudiced by the withdrawal; accordingly in the present case
the lessor's disagreement afforded no legal basis for denial of the
lessee's application to withdraw.
IV. APPEAL AND ERROR
A. Appealable Orders
In Knox County v. Burroughs,5' the supreme court reiterated the
well-settled rule that there can be no appeal in law cases from
interlocutory orders of a trial court. Discretionary appeals are permitted by statute in equity cases, whether on trial in the circuit or
chancery court,5 2 but there is no comparable provision in law cases.
In the present case, a plea in abatement was overruled in a condemnation case. The supreme court held that this was not an appealable order since it clearly was not a final judgment of the law
court. The court indicated that it would prefer to pass upon the issues
presented upon the proposed appeal, but it was unable to do so
under existing procedures. Of course the underlying reason for disallowing interlocutory appeals-the piecemeal and successive review
of issues in the same cause-is unquestionably sound in most instances.
Clearly, however, there are instances where vital and determinative
issues are raised by preliminary pleadings in law courts. Appeals from
interlocutory orders could sometimes be extremely useful in obtaining authoritative rulings before the parties are put to the expense of
trial on the merits. A statute allowing such appeals, in the discretion
of the trial judge, would seem to be as necessary and proper in law
cases as in chancery practice.
50.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1531 (Supp. 1963).

51. 369 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1963).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-305 (Supp. 1963).
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B. Writ of Error
The right of a party to have his case reviewed by the appellate
courts on writ of error when he files an appeal bond too late to
perfect an appeal in the nature of a writ of error was reiterated in
Ward v. North American Rayon Corp.53 Where the appealing party
files in the appellate court a properly certified copy of the transcript,
together with a proper bond and assignments of error within
one year of the judgment below, he is entitled to review on
writ of error.- Since the period for perfecting an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error is relatively short, 5 a party might be deprived
of an effective means of review were it not for the "escape valve" of
filing the record for review on writ of error, where he or his attorney
inadvertently or for some other cause failed to file a bond or pauper's
oath within the time limit for perfecting an appeal in the nature of
a writ of error.5 6 The scope of review under the two procedures is
essentially the same, but the writ of error does not automatically
supersede the judgment below; 57 the appeal in the nature of writ of
error, duly perfected, automatically suspends the enforcement of the
judgment appealed from.58
C. Errors Not Assigned by Counsel
In Carterv. Jett, 9 the court of appeals reversed a trial court decree
upon the basis of error not assigned by counsel for appellant. Although this power of the appellate courts is not frequently called into
play, it clearly exists and is appropriately exercised in the proper
administration of the functions of a reviewing court. It is provided for
in the rules of both the supreme court 0 and the court of appeals.6'
D. Disposition on Appeal
1. Effect of Judgment of Appellate Court.-An unusual procedural
situation was presented in the case of Sanders v. Loyd.62 There had
been an action and cross-action in a general sessions court, arising out
of the same automobile accident. Both actions were dismissed at the
hearing. Only the original plaintiff appealed from this judgment. In
the circuit court, however, by inadvertence it had been assumed
53. 211 Tenn. 535, 366 S.W.2d 134 (1963).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-601 to -612 (1956).

55. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 27-312 (1956).
56. See Sanders v. Loyd, 364 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
57. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 27-611 (1956).

58. Gu.EEATH, HISTORY OF A LAWsrr § 445 (8th. ed. 1963).
59. 370 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
60. TENN. Sup. CT. R. 15(2).
61. TENN. CT. APP. R. 12.
62. 364 S.W.2d 369 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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that both parties had appealed. When trial was had in that court,
the circuit judge dismissed the original plaintiff's suit and granted
judgment for the "cross-plaintiff" (the original defendant, who had
not appealed from sessions court). On appeal this result was reversed by the court of appeals which purported to dismiss both
actions. Thereafter the original defendant and cross-plaintiff sought
to have his sessions suit reviewed in circuit court by writ of certiorari.
The circuit court had granted the writ, taking the view that the
previous order of the court of appeals had not amounted to a review
of this action on the merits and that the action in reality had remained in the sessions court all the while. The court of appeals in the
present opinion reversed this holding, and held that its previous
judgment, dismissing both suits, was final and binding upon all
parties. Even if erroneously entered, the judgment had not been
modified and became final, so that no further orders or proceedings
could be had in any other court. Unless and until the order of dismissal was modified or vacated (and this had not occurred), it was
operative, and the circuit court was without authority or jurisdiction
to proceed further, particularly in view of the fact that no order of
remand or mandate had ever issued from the appellate court to the
lower court.
2. Effect of Reversal of Directed Verdict Below.-In Baggett v.
Louisville & N. Ry., 63 there had been a directed verdict for defendant
in the circuit court. The circuit judge had let the case go to the jury.
received a jury verdict for plaintiffs, and had then set aside the
verdict and entered judgment for defendant. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that jury issues were presented under the evidence.
Upon authority of previous Tennessee case law, however, the corot
held that it had no power to reinstate a jury verdict which had not
received approval of the trial judge. 64 Accordingly it simply remanded
the cause for a new trial on the merits.
3. Enforcement of Supreme Court Judgments.-In 1962 the Tennessee Supreme Court had rendered a decision upholding the constitutionality of certain ordinances of annexation. 65 It denied a petition
to rehear and an application for a stay order. Petition for certiorari
was filed in the United States Supreme Court, but that Court also, on
two occasions, denied applications for a stay order. Thereafter the
losing parties in the previous suit filed the present proceedings in
chancery to enjoin various city officials from enforcing the ordinances.
The supreme court granted defendants' petition for certiorari, issued
an order superseding any action taken or to be taken in the second
63. 365 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).

64. Smith v. Tucker, 203 Tenn. 305, 311 S.W.2d 807 (1958).
65. State ex rel. Stall v. City of Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 271, 364 S.W.2d 898 (1962).
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suit, and permanently enjoined the complainants from in any way
interfering with the previous judgment entered by the supreme
court. 66 In its opinion the court pointed out that it has both statutory"
and inherent authority to issue whatever writs or processes may be
necessary to enforce its judgments.
4. Effect of Reversal of Court of Appeals.-In Warren v. Crockett,68
a circuit judge had directed a verdict for defendant at the conclusion of plaintiff's proof. Thereafter he granted a new trial, and
there was a verdict for plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the
first action of the trial judge had been correct, and accordingly
entered judgment for defendant as on a directed verdict. The supreme
court reversed this ruling, holding that a jury issue was presented and
that a directed verdict on the record of the first trial was improper. Inasmuch as defendant had assigned errors on the record of the second
trial, however, and these had not been reviewed by the court of
appeals, the supreme court remanded the cause to that court for
consideration of the record in the second trial of the cause.
V. FEDERAL CoURTs

A. District Courts
1. Pleading-RelationBack of Amendment.-In Roberson v. Bitner,8
there was an insufficient allegation of diversity of citizenship in
the 'original complaint. Defendant sought to have the suit dismissed, but plaintiff moved to amend so as to state adequately a
basis of federal jurisdiction by reason of diversity. The state statute
of limitations had expired between the time of filing suit and the
date of the amendment. The district court, however, held that the
amendment would be allowed. Since the amendment showed that
at the date of the filing of suit facts existed under which the court
had jurisdiction, the court's jurisdiction became "operative" at the
date of the original action; the subsequent running of the statute
of limitations did not bar the suit, and the amendment related back
to the date of the original complaint.
2. Jurisdiction- (a) Lack of Diversity.-In the case of Howard v.
United States,70 plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained by her in a post-office building.
The federal government leased the building, and plaintiff joined
the landowner as an additional defendant. The district court dis66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

State ex rel. Stall v. City of Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ -16-102, 16-305, 27-801 (1956).
211 Tenn. 172, 364 S.W.2d 352 (1962).
218 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
214 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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missed the suit as to him, however, since both he and the plaintiff
were residents of Tennessee, and no separate or independent basis of
federal jurisdiction existed as to that defendant.
(b) Lack of Separate Claim.-Two non-resident defendants were

sued along with a resident defendant in a Tennessee state court.7 1
They sought to remove the action to the district court. Plaintiff,
however, was also a Tennessee resident, so that complete diversity of
'citizenship between the parties was lacking. The non-residents
contended that as to them there existed a separate and independent
claim, which was removable under the federal statutes. 72 From an
examination of the pleadings, however, the district court found only
that there were allegations of one threatened wrong to plaintiff by
all of the defendants through an interlocking series of transactions.
Since the state court had already issued a preliminary injunction in
the case, and since a separate and independent claim was not found
to exist as to the non-residents, the court remanded the entire cause
to the state court for further proceedings.
(c) CorporationDoing Business in State.-In Trussell v. Bear Mfg.
Co.,73 a foreign corporation which had not qualified to do business in

the state and which had no physical facilities in the state was
nevertheless held to be "doing business" in the state so as to
be amenable to service of process through the Tennessee Secretary of State.74 The corporation sold its products to a Tennessee
jobber, its representatives had meetings in Tennessee with the jobber's
salesmen, and supervised the installation of equipment sold by the
jobber. This representative was found by the court not to be an
independent contractor but to be under the control of the foreign
corporation. The corporation was found to be doing substantial,
continuous intrastate business under all of the circumstances.75
B. Court of Appeals
1. Jurisdiction-Non-ResidentMotorist Statute.-In a case of first

impression under the Tennessee non-resident motorist statutes, 76 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a non-resident who
had come to Tennessee to purchase a new automobile and who was
driving it to her home under dealer's "drive-out" license tags, was
subject to process in Tennessee when she was involved in an accident
with another vehicle on the highways of this state. 77
71. Laughters v. AMF Pinspotters, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).

72. 28 U.S.C. §1441(c) (1958).

73. 215 F.Supp. 802 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
74. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-220, 48-293 (1956).

75. For a state court decision on the same subject during the survey period, see
Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. v. Ortiz, 50 Tenn. App. 317, 361 S.W.2d 113 (W.S. 1962).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-224 to -234 (Supp. 1963).

77. Williams v. Kitchin, 316 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1963).

